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Corporate governance structures, control and performance in European markets:
A tale of two systems.
Traditionally share price returns and their variance have been explained by factors linked to the
operations of the company such as systematic risk, corporate size and P/E ratios or by factors related to
the influence of the macro-economic environment. In these models, the institutional environment in terms
of concentration and nature of voting rights, bank debt dependence and corporate and legal mechanisms
to change control have rarely been included. In this paper we have a dual objective. We first highlight the
large discrepancies among corporate governance environments.  We conclude that there is a need for a
theoretically well-grounded measure of corporate control applicable to all systems and we define such a
measure.  Secondly, the impact of ownership structure on the share price performance and corporate risk
is empirically analysed for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Within Europe, the UK
corporate landscape is particularly interesting because of its widely held nature and the liquidity of the
market for controlling rights.  We show that financial performance increases with the level of control held
by the second largest shareholder.  One possible explanation is that when the largest shareholder owns
most of the control, she essentially maximizes her own utility function, which may differ from the firm’s
profits.  When there exists a counterbalancing pole of control in other hands, utility functions are usually
different and the best compromise between both poles of control may be to maximize profits.  Yet, it was
not our purpose to survey the many (sometimes contradictory) theories of corporate governance, nor to
test any specific hypothesis.  We hope however to have conveyed the message that there exists a link
between corporate governance and financial performance and that a sound index, based on game-theoretic
arguments, is the appropriate instrument for researchers in the field.
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1.     Introduction
Traditionally share price returns and their variance have been explained by factors linked to
the operations of the company such as systematic risk, corporate size and P/E ratios (as in
Fama and French, 1992, among many examples) or by factors related to the influence of the
macro-economic environment. In these models, the institutional environment in terms of
concentration and nature of voting rights, bank debt dependence and corporate and legal
mechanisms to change control have rarely been included. In fact, empirical research on the
dynamics of ownership and its impact on corporate performance in European economies has
only become possible in recent years. Indeed, while detailed data on ownership for listed
corporations in Anglo-American markets have been available for some decades, the European
Commission’s Transparency Directive of 1988 (88/627/EEC) has only gradually been
integrated into the national legislation of continental European countries.1 Even so, each
country retained the right to modulate the Commission’s directive according to its own
specific requirements with the result that ownership disclosure regulation of voting rights
differs substantially across countries in terms of notification thresholds and frequency.2 In this
paper we have a dual objective. Firstly, we focus on highlighting the large discrepancies
among corporate governance environments.  As environments differ widely, we conclude that
there is a need for a theoretically well-grounded measure of corporate control applicable to all
systems and we define such a measure.  Secondly, the impact of ownership structure on the
share price performance and corporate risk is empirically analysed for companies listed on the
London Stock Exchange. Within Europe, the UK corporate landscape is particularly
interesting because of its widely held nature and the liquidity of the market for controlling
rights.  We show that financial performance increases with the level of control held by the
second largest shareholder.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the main differences in ownership
structures in Europe. The section draws upon the first (unpublished) research results of the
European Corporate Governance Network3. For convenience, the main preliminary country
studies of this on-going research effort are mentioned separately in the bibliography. In section
3, we show that voting rights are but one element – albeit an important factor – in the
corporate governance framework and we highlight the role of corporate law, minority
protection, courts and banks.  Section 4 focuses on a key issue in any economic analysis of
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corporate governance, i.e. the definition of effective measures of control in complex
ownership structures, possibly characterised by multiple, intertwined layers of shareholding.
We briefly discuss the weaknesses of classical approaches to this issue (via raw voting rights
or Herfindahl indices) and we propose an alternative measure of control based on the Banzhaf
index (well-known to game theorists) which we call the Z index.  We illustrate why the Z
index more adequately captures each shareholder's negotiating power. On the basis of a sample
of British companies, section 5 provides an econometric illustration of the importance of
control dispersion on some key economic variables (beta and returns).  We also briefly
illustrate how the Z index can be applied in the case of Continental European economies.
Conclusions are presented in section 6.
2.      Ownership concentration and voting blocks
Insider versus outsider corporate governance systems
In spite of the relative paucity of data on shareholding structure, some striking features emerge
from a simple cross-country comparison. For example, Table 1 highlights the major difference
in ownership concentration between continental Europe and the Anglo-American countries. In
the former, all large (disclosing) shareholders combined own more than 60% of the equity
capital4, in the latter these control only about 40% of the voting rights. The differences in
voting rights held by the largest shareholder are even more remarkable: the largest owner in
the median UK listed company holds a stake of less than 15% and this stake is less than 5% in
the US. In contrast the largest shareholder (or group of large shareholders) controls 40-54% of
the voting rights on the continent. About 85% of the listed non-financial companies in
Continental Europe have a large shareholder which holds at least a blocking minority (25%)
and in about half the companies, one shareholder owns an absolute majority.
<Table 1 about here>
The high concentration of ownership in Continental European equity markets is only one
manifestation of what is known as an insider system.  The corporate sector has controlling
interests in itself because companies are often shareholders of other ones; the number of listed
companies is small compared to the size of the economy; and the capital market is illiquid
because controlling blocks are held by a few dominant shareholders.  Worse still, in spite of all
the efforts made to simplify corporate structures, there remains a large number of holdings or
interlocked companies, which de facto deter any attempt by outsiders to control any of them
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(Renneboog, 2000).  Thus, while given an opportunity to participate in equity returns, outside
investors have little hope to trade and acquire control. In contrast, the Anglo-American system is
labelled as an outsider system.  In that system, the number of listed companies is large; the
process of acquiring control (not only participate in equity return) is effectively market-oriented
(i.e. there is a liquid capital market with frequently traded ownership and control rights); and
there are few corporate holdings or interlocked patterns of ownership.  Finally, there are few
major, controlling shareholdings and these are rarely associated with the corporate sector itself
(Wymeersch, 1994, Franks and Mayer, 1995).
Cash flow versus voting rights
Although equity markets in Continental Europe indeed display some similarity, they also
markedly differ with regard to a number of criteria.  We concentrate on two of them.  Firstly,
as shown in Table 1, the nature of the main shareholders varies from country to country.
Obviously, each category of shareholder has different incentives or abilities to exert control.
For example, there is little evidence that institutional investors undertake any disciplinary
actions against poorly performing management (Stapledon, 1996). In contrast, corporate
shareholders might value dominant  shareholding positions, not only for the financial return of
their investment, but also for other potential benefits of control, especially when a customer or
supplier relation exists with the target company (Barclay and Holderness, 1989).
Secondly, the complexity of ownership structures also varies across countries. Germany, for
example, is characterised by complex shareholdings around and within industrial groups
(Becht and Boehmer, 1998) while the French system is characterised by ownership cascades
of financial groups and cross-company shareholdings (Bloch and Kremp, 1998). In Italy, long
pyramids controlled by state or family-owned corporations are typical (Bianchi et al., 1998).
More than a third of listed and non-listed Belgian companies are controlled by financial
holdings companies (Becht et al., 1998) while in most Dutch listed companies, the separation
of ownership and control is almost absolute, as blocks of voting rights are not held by
shareholders but by an Administration Office  (De Jong et al., 1998). Finally, although state
controlled ownership has decreased substantially in Spain since 1995, state holding companies
still own a golden-share in strategic sectors (Crespi and Garcia, 1998).
These differences have important implications in terms of the one-share-one-vote principle
dear to game theorists. Ownership pyramids, for instance, allow power concentration with
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limited investment, since controlling a target company can be achieved via a number of
subsidiaries and a chain of 51% of their voting rights.  With one intermediate holding, the
ultimate shareholder retains absolute control while only receiving 25% (=0.51×0.51) of the
cash flow.5 Whereas legal restrictions have impeded the occurrence of ownership cascades in
the UK, they are common practice in Belgium, France or Italy. Another way of amassing
voting power is through voting pacts and proxy votes. For example, voting pacts are not
uncommon in Germany (Chirinko and Elston, 1995) and German banks commonly use proxy
votes of the shares deposited in their custody (called the “Depotstimmrecht”,  see for example
Wenger and Kaserer, 1997).6
Still, a number of mechanisms exist to erode voting power, such as the imposition of voting
caps. An extreme case is the Netherlands where under the ‘structural governance regime’,
non-voting certificates are distributed to ordinary shareholders while the voting power is given
to a foundation controlled by company insiders (De Jong et al, 1998). In Germany, Belgium or
Spain, a decision by the board of directors can limit any percentage of voting power to e.g.
5%.7 Whereas dual class shares are frequently used to separate ownership and control in
Sweden (Agnblad et al. 1999), this has been actively discouraged in the UK by the LSE
(Brennan and Franks, 1997). Finally, since the take-over wave in the 1980s, several poison
pills like shelf registration of equity8, issuing bonds cum warrants or convertible bonds, are
frequently used to dilute the voting power of ‘hostile’ shareholders.
Corporate governance and agency costs
Both the insider and outsider corporate governance systems present weaknesses and
advantages which can be analysed in terms of the principal-agent theory (see Table 2).  The
Anglo-American system, characterised by high dispersion of voting and cash flow rights and
called the ‘Weak owners, strong managers’–case by Roe (1994), may induce free riding9 on
control. As a single small shareholder only benefits from performance improvements in direct
proportion to the cash flow rights, he or she may not find it profitable to monitor management
while a large shareholder will necessarily feel differently. This situation may result in agency
conflicts between management and shareholders.10 Still, the large free float allows investors to
take advantage of portfolio diversification possibilities and introduces the discipline of the
(hostile) take-over market11.
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Concentration of ownership and voting rights, on the other hand, stimulates corporate
governance actions against under-performing management, but may lead to expropriation of
the rights of minority shareholders as discussed in panel D of Table 2. Furthermore, share
liquidity is reduced due to the low free float and hostile take-overs are virtually ruled out.
<Table 2 about here>
Panels B and C of Table 2 present the other combinations of concentrations of ownership and
voting rights which can be attained by some of the instruments described above to amass or
dilute voting power. For example, when shareholder coalitions or proxy votes are allowed, the
supervisory power of a block of shareholders vis-à-vis management increases, but the agency
conflicts shift from shareholder-management towards large versus minority shareholders.
3.      Corporate governance : symbiosis of financial markets and corporate law.
The discussion above clearly points to the difficulty in explaining corporate governance
systems on the basis of conventional theories.  In this section, we shall emphasise this critical
point before moving on to a discussion of the methodology we use to measure control.
Indeed, neither transaction costs theory12, nor principal agent theory13, nor the theory of
implicit contracting14 nor the theory of vertical integration15 can fully explain why two
governance systems (Continental European and Anglo-American) have emerged or, in a more
refined way, why Continental European countries differ in terms of structure and
concentration of ownership (cash flow rights) and voting rights. In the previous section, we
have shown that the weaknesses of both systems have been partially dealt with through
mechanisms separating cash flow and voting rights. In addition however, governments have
often found it necessary to develop a legal environment able to limit the inconveniences (e.g.
agency costs) induced by the corporate governance system.
In fact, historic evolution of regulation has shaped ownership structures, capital markets and
corporate governance systems. Not surprisingly, there are two broad legal traditions; the
common law system, found in Anglo-American countries and the Commonwealth, and the
civil law tradition of Continental Europe and its sphere of influence (former colonies). These
two legal systems are different in terms of shareholder protection, adherence to the one-share-
one-vote principle and creditor protection. According to Laporta et al. (1996 and 1997), the
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common law system appears to provide stronger shareholder and creditor protection.16 But
legal distinction can explain differences in corporate governance systems and the degree of
capital market development.  In common law countries, the ratio of external capital to GDP is
higher, as are the ratio of corporate debt to GDP and the number of listed domestic firms and
initial public offerings as a proportion of the corporate population. Whether or not the
institutional environment has a momentous impact on economic activity has been explored by
a number of authors.  In particular, Carlin and Mayer (1998) investigate the relation between
economic growth, R&D investment and fixed income formation, on the one hand, and the
presence of bank-firm relations, development of security markets, degree of ownership
concentration and the legal system on the other. For a sample of companies in 20 countries,
there is little influence of banking activity and ownership concentration on economic growth,
but they find that  legal protection of investors and development of securities markets matter.
A seemingly logical implication of the discussion above is that it would be extremely difficult
to develop a set of corporate governance regulations applicable to all EU countries without
undertaking the difficult task of concomitantly dismantling the existing country-specific
mechanisms that currently provide shareholder protection. Indeed, several attempts made in
that direction had to be withdrawn.  For example, the mandatory take-over bid requirement for
all listed companies included in the first draft of the 13th Company Law Directive was
dropped. The consequence would have been a weakening of direct monitoring resulting from
reduced voting block sizes (Becht, 1999). The 5th Company Law Directive (now abandoned as
well) aimed at imposing the one-share-one-vote rule on all European companies. As dual class
shares would also have been ruled out, there was a danger that shareholders would have
reacted by relying increasingly on pyramids and voting pacts in order to retain control, thereby
reducing market liquidity.
4. Effective measures of control
The weakness of Herfindahl indices
The previous discussion underlines the difficulty of apprehending the whole intricacy and
diversity of the issues surrounding corporate governance. In this context, a most fundamental
question appears to be that of measuring the extent to which a given company is controlled by
each of its (ultimate) shareholders and to measure the dispersion of control among
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shareholders. Economists have proposed a number of indices to answer this question. Most of
these indices belong to the Herfindahl family, i.e. they focus on the (square of the) proportion
of shares owned by the largest direct shareholder(s) in the company. We claim, however, that
such indices do not provide a theoretically sound measure of dispersion.
Let us first tackle the case of the Anglo-American or “outsider ” system.  Consider a target
company whose capital is first diluted from 5 shares to 7 shares, then from 7 to 9 shares, as
illustrated in Exhibits 1a to 1c (in Table 3).  It is easy to verify that company A1 has full
control over the target in Exhibit 1a, no more control than any other shareholder in Exhibit
1b17 (meaning that dilution leads to less concentration of control in this case), but more than
any other shareholder in Exhibit 1c18 (meaning that dilution leads to higher control
concentration in this case). Yet, each successive dilution yields Herfindahl indices which
wrongly diagnose less concentration, mostly due to the fact that the proportion of shares
owned by company A1 steadily decreases in the process!19 In addition, since Herfindahl
indices concentrate on the largest shareholders and totally disregard the float, they fail to
integrate a very important element of the potential disciplinary effect of small shareholders in
the outsider system.
<Tables 3a and 3b about here>
Let us next consider the case of the Continental European (or insider) system. By definition,
Herfindahl indices can only tackle one layer of shareowners. While this may be a good
approximation of reality in outsider systems, a simple look at Exhibit 2 (Table 3) reveals that it
is clearly insufficient in more complex, multi-layered structures.  Indeed, should one compute
the Herfindahl index on the basis of the largest direct shareholder (which we already know is
wrong from Exhibit 1b) or take into account the presence of B1 and B2 ?  If we do the latter,
A2 (or A3 or A4 indifferently) becomes the largest shareholder since B1 would only have the
equivalent of 9/5 (= 3*3/5 < 2) direct shares.  In practice, however, B1 has more control over
T than any other shareholder and a Herfindahl index would fail to diagnose it.
Similarly, corporate laws fail to capture the whole complexity of the issue. Banking
commissions and other regulatory bodies usually rely on rather simple concepts of corporate
control, whereby owners are classified into a small number of distinct categories. For instance,
a shareholder is said to detain majority control if he controls (directly or indirectly) more than
51 percent of the shares; he has at least a blocking minority if he controls between 25 and 50
percent of the shares (and could be considered to have more control if he has the ability to
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remove administrators); otherwise, he is viewed as having no control at all. There are many
situations, however, where such rules prove unsatisfactory. A striking example occurs when a
single individual (call him for instance Bill Gates) owns 20 percent of the shares of a company
(call it Microsoft), while the remaining 80% of the shares are totally dispersed among an
"ocean" of small investors. In such a case, the main shareholder typically rules the company,
while legal regulations would consider him as possessing no significant control.20
Thus, it appears difficult to build indices of corporate control that succeed in providing
effective and consistent estimates of ownership dispersion, especially when studying a variety
of corporate governance systems.  Promising attempts, however, have been made to handle
this question within a formal game theoretic framework.  The idea is here to model
shareholders as players in a voting game, and to use classical power indices (such as Shapley
indices, see e.g. Owen (1982)) to measure the extent of their control over a target company.
Intuitively, such power indices reflect the relative ability of each player (or shareholder) to
impose his will to the target company through coalitions with other players. This approach has
been applied to the study of corporate control by a few authors (see Cubbin and Leech, 1983;
Gambarelli, 1991; Zwiebel, 1995). Yet, their investigations are mostly theoretical and/or
restricted to the analysis of a single layer of shareowners.
We propose here to use the Banzhaf index, which measures the ability of a voter to swing the
decision in his or her own favor.  More precisely, the Banzhaf index of a player can be defined
as the probability that the outcome of the voting process changes when the player changes her
mind unilaterally, under the assumption that all vectors of votes are equally likely (see
Banzhaf, 1965, 1966, 1968).  Although there are technical differences between the Banzhaf
Index and the Shapley value, both indices essentially capture the same phenomenon and often
yield nearly equivalent measures of power.  However, we found the Banzhaf Index easier to
compute algorithmically, especially in the case of complex structures.  The reader interested in
a detailed discussion of the differences between the Banzhaf Index and the Shapley value is
referred to Dubey and Shapley (1979).
Thus, we have computed an index (the Z Index) largely based on Banzhaf’s methodology.  For
the computation of the Z Index, we have assumed that the float was constituted of a large
number of small voters.  This is not always done as it is often assumed that only large
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shareholders matter, in which case the float is neglected by normalizing the total number of
shares to the sum of the shares held by the largest identified shareholders.
How to compute the Z Index: an illustration
For those not familiar with game-theoretic power indices, we illustrate the computation of the
Z Index in the simple cases displayed in Table 3a.  The mechanics are a little tedious but
simple.  Let us first consider Exhibit 1a, and assume that there is one issue concerning T on
which shareholders have to vote “yes ” or “no ”.  Assuming that votes are not correlated, there
are 4 (22) possible voting strings as shown in Table 3b.  Among these, there are two where
(A1) changes her mind while (A2) does not.  Thus, (A1) changes her mind twice and the result
of the vote changes in both occasions.  On the other hand, although (A2) changes her mind
twice as well, the final vote does not change in either occasion, reflecting the absolute
incapacity of (A2) to affect the outcome.  We already knew that (A1) has full control over T.
The Z index is computed as the ratio between the number of swings in the final outcome
induced by each player over the total number of swings in the final outcome induced by all
players.  It is equal to 100 percent (2/2) for (A1) and 0 percent (0/2) for (A2).  Let us move to
Exhibit 1b.  There are 8 (23) possible voting strings among which 4 correspond to situation
where (A1) changes her mind while the others do not.  Thus, (A1) can induce two swings in
the final outcome when changing her mind 4 times.  The same holds for both other players, so
that a change in the final outcome caused by one single change of mind can only occur in 6
instances.  Thus, the Z Index for each player is the same and equal to 2/6 or 1/3.  Consider
now Exhibit 1c.  This time there are 16 (24) possible voting strings.  A similar computation,
detailed in Table 3b shows that the Z Index has now increased for (A1) from 1/3 to ½ while
the Z Index of all three other players has gone down to 1/6.  Thus, the Z Index provides results
which are fully consistent with the intuition discussed in the previous subsection.  In
particular, the control held by (A1) goes down then up as the capital is diluted.
In order to make the case that the Z Index can be used in more complex structures, we also
consider Exhibit 2.  There are 5 players only because the vote of (A1) is fully determined by
the vote of (B1) and (B2).  A similar mechanism based on the analysis of 32 (25) possible
voting strings shows that the Z Index is ½ for (B1), 1/6 for (A2), (A3), and (A4) and 0 for
(B2).
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In the next section, we use the Z index to analyse the impact of corporate ownership
dispersion on the financial performance of firms.21
5.  Empirical results
Corporate control in the UK
We have already discussed the main features of the corporate governance system that prevails
in the UK.  We are now going to describe some of the relationships that emerge between the
financial characteristics of firms, on the one hand, and either Herfindahl or Z indices on the
other, as they emerge from an empirical study of a panel of listed British firms.
Data sources
A random sample of 250 companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange was selected and
(yearly) data relative to these companies were collected for the period 1988-1993. All
disclosed ownership stakes were retrieved from microfiche and hard-copy annual reports :
these include all beneficial and non-beneficial shareholders with stakes of 3% or more, as well
as all directors’ shareholdings.  Whenever a nominee was mentioned as major shareholder, the
individual, corporation or institution behind the nominee shareholding was identified by
contacting the companies’ finance managers. The risk measures are from the Risk
Measurement Service; betas have been calculated via a Vasicek Bayesian-updating procedure.
Share price performance measures are from the London Share Price Database. Accounting and
firm specific characteristics data (including several non-risk security characteristics dividends,
P/E ratio, etc) are from Datastream.
Tests and results
In order to illustrate the importance of ownership dynamics in the economy, we report here on
two specific issues.  First, we investigate the possible link between the performance of a stock
and the ownership structure of the firm at the previous period. Performance is measured by
annual return, i.e. by the ratio called Returnt in Table 4: (capital gain plus dividend) to (value
of the stock at the previous period).  Four types of control indices are used to capture the
ownership structure of each firm:
<Table 4 about here>
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• Z1 denotes the Z index of the largest shareholder;
• Z2 denotes the Z index of the second largest shareholder;
• Herf1 denotes the square of the percentage of shares detained by the largest shareholder;
• Herf5 denotes the sum of squared percentages of shares detained by the five largest
shareholders.
The other variables appearing in the regression (Table 4) are standard and are included to
control for firm specific characteristiucs.  They include the level of employment (Emplt-1),
market capitalization (Mcapt-1), the price-earning ratio (PE ratiot-1), the systematic risk of the
stock as measured by its Beta (Betat-1) and a dummy for the sector of activity (Sectort).  Note
that a Z index is defined for each firm’s shareholder while Herfindahl indices correspond to a
distribution of ownership for the firm.  Thus, while Herf1 and Z1 may correspond to the same
unique financial link when the largest direct shareholder also happens to be the largest
ultimate shareholder, there is no such similarity between the Z indices and Herfindahl indices
of higher order.
In a second model, we investigate the possible link between the systematic risk of a stock, as
measured by its Beta, and the above indices of ownership structure.
Thus, we have obtained three econometric equations (with either H1 and H2; or Z1 and Z2; or
Z1 only respectively) explaining returns and three explaining the Beta.  The main results are
summarised in Table 4.
It is interesting to note that the coefficients of both Z indices are highly significant in both
models tested. By contrast, the coefficients of Herf1 and Herf5 are only significant at a very
low level.  We believe this is a quite remarkable result, since the British market is one for
which the difference between Herfindhal and Z indices could a priori be expected to be less
marked. Note that one should be careful before drawing definitive conclusions given the
potential pitfalls that apply to this type of standard cross-sectional studies of stock returns (see
inter alia, Kan and Zhang, 1999; Kim, 1995).
The results of our estimation nevertheless show that the presence of a substantial controlling
minority in the hands of the second largest shareholder has a positive and statistically
significant impact on financial performance. A possible explanation for this phenomenon goes
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as follows.  When the largest shareholder owns most of the control (Z1 is high, Z2 is low),
she essentially maximizes her own utility function, which may differ from the firm’s profits.
When there exists a counterbalancing pole of control (both Z1 and Z2 are high), utility
functions are usually different and the best compromise is then to maximize profits.  This
balancing effect clearly appears as the coefficient of Z2 is significantly positive while that of
Z1 is significantly negative.  For information, we also include the equation where only Z1
appears.
As a matter of fact, many arguments have been proposed in the literature to predict the sign of
the relationship between ownership dispersion and the financial performance or risk of a stock.
It has been argued, for instance, that dispersed ownership increases the role of management
and thereby affects the financial performance of the firm.22  It is not our purpose here to
survey these (sometimes contradictory) theories nor to test any specific hypothesis.  We
simply want to suggest that a link exists between corporate governance and financial
performance and that a sound index, based on game-theoretic arguments, is a useful
instrument for researchers in the field.
The case of insider systems
 The above analysis dealt with the case of an outsider system, for which Herfindhal indices do
not exhibit all of the weaknesses described in Section 4.  As already mentioned, we may
expect to observe an even more striking difference between the behaviour of Herfindahl
indices (computed on the basis of direct shareholdings) and Z indices in insider systems,
characterised by interlocked pyramidal ownership structures. We do not carry out here a
detailed econometric analysis for this type of systems.  However, we can present some partial
evidence to sustain this claim.
Using a sample of French companies, we have computed the Z index for the main (possibly
indirect) shareholder and compared it with the percentage of shares held by the largest direct
shareholder.  We display here two exhibits (see Table 5).  In the first exhibit, we show the
relationship between the Z index for the main shareholder and the percentage of shares held
when the latter is below 50 percent (about 35 companies). It is readily apparent that the
relation between both indicators is highly non linear.  In the second exhibit, we display the Z
index of the main indirect shareholder for a sample of about 70 companies in which the largest
direct shareholder owns more than 50 percent.  Note that this does not imply a Z index of 1
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because the majority direct shareholder may feature a dispersed ownership structure itself.23
Actually, the graph in Table 5 suggests that this must often be the case.
<Table 5 about here>
Thus, it clearly appears that the Z Index provides a strikingly different picture of shareholding
structures from that based on the Herfindahl concept.  The above discussion also shows that
the Z Index (or any index of a similar nature) would provide a sound measure for all systems
of corporate governance.
6. Conclusion
This paper has described two broad systems of corporate governance existing in Continental
Europe (the insider system) and in the UK (and the US, the outsider system). We have
emphasised a number of striking differences in concentration and nature of ownership between
both systems.  For example, in a typical Continental European country, (majority) control is
held by one shareholder or a small group of interlocked (corporate) shareholders, whereas
Anglo-American companies are predominantly widely held. These discrepancies have
important consequences in terms of agency costs and therefore, mechanisms have been
developed in most countries to separate ownership (cash flow rights) and control (voting
rights) both at the level of the firm and through corporate law.
The complexity of apprehending the numerous and intricate issues related to corporate
governance has led us to focus on the need to adequately measure the extent to which a
company is controlled by its shareholders.  We have shown that traditional indices belonging
to the Herfindahl family do not provide theoretically sound measures and have proposed to use
another index (the Z index) based on the idea that shareholders are players in a voting game.
In order to illustrate the importance of ownership dynamics on the economy, we analysed
empirically the impact of the Z-index and Herfindahl indices on the financial performance of a
stock and its risk (measured by the beta).  Given the widely held nature of companies listed on
the London Stock Exchange, the importance of the role played by potential shareholder
coalitions, and the availability of data, the equations have been estimated for the UK.  Our
results point to the fact that voting power, as measured by  Z indices, is tightly correlated to
both share price performance and risk.  Classical Herfindahl indices, on the other hand, appear
to exhibit a weaker relationship.
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We also find that financial performance is highest for companies where the second largest
shareholder has a substantial amount of control.  This is because with a counterbalancing pole
of control, the largest shareholder is forced to compromise and maximize firm’s profits rather
than his or her own utility function.
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Table 1 : Concentration of voting rights by country
This table presents total ownership concentration of all large shareholders and of the largest shareholder. The ownership classes which hold (cumulatively)
the largest percentage of equity in the average listed company are also exhibited.
Ownership data capture both direct and indirect (ultimate) shareholdings: all voting rights controlled directly and indirectly possibly via a cascade of intermediate
holdings are added. In other words, alliances based on share stakes are taken into account.
The companies in these studies are listed and exclude financial institutions.
Studies (1998) Sample co's Disclosure Total ownership concentr. Largest shareholding Shareholder classes with
Eur.Corp.Governance Network All quoted Threshold Mean Median Mean Median largest nbr of voting rights
Most 2nd most
Austria Gugler, Kalss, Stomper, Zechner 50 listed (all) 5% 65.5 60.0 54.1 52.0 Domestic co's Fx co's/bks
Belgium Becht et al. 150 listed (all) 5% 63.4 66.5 55.8 55.5 (Fin)Holding co's Ind&com Co's
France Bloch and Kemp 40 listed (CAC) (1) 5% 52.0 30.0 29.4 20.0 Fin. holding co's Ind&com Co's
Germany Becht and Boehmer 374 listed (all) (3) 5% <65% <65% n.a. 52.1 Companies Fin. Inst.
Italy Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques 216 listed (all) 2% 68.4 62.3 51.9 54.5 Companies Individuals
Netherlands De Jong, Kabir, Mara and 137 listed (all) 5% 62.5 69.8 42.8 43.5 Administr. office Fin. Inst.
Spain Crespi and Garcia-Cestona 193 listed (all) 5% 65.1 63.2 40.1 34.2 Domestic co's Fx co's
UK Goergen et al. 250 listed (2) 3% 40.8 39.0 15.2 10.9 Institutions Directors
US Becht 1309 (NYSE) 5% ca 30% n.a. <5% <5% Institutions Individuals
All studies (a.o.) forthcoming in Barca, F. and M. Becht (1999) : Ownership and Control: A European perspective, Oxford Univ. Press
Note : (1) for all 680 French listed firms, the largest owner controls an average of 56% of voting rights. Companies which are part of an index have to assure sufficient
Liquidity; hence, the high free float and smaller blockholdings. For comparison; the median largest voting block of a DAX30 company amounts to 11.0%.
(2) random sample of all non-financial firms listed on the LSE.
(3) all listed from the official market.
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Table 2: Ownership and Voting Power: Structure and Consequences
Panel A : Dispersed Ownership and Dispersed Voting Power
- where : US, UK.
- advantages : a. portfolio diversification and liquidity; b. take over possibility
- disadvantages : insufficient monitoring : free riding problem
- agency conflicts : management vs shareholders
Panel B : Dispersed Ownership and Concentrated Voting Power
- where : countries where a stake holder can collect proxy votes and shareholder
coalitions are  allowed.
- advantages : a. monitoring of management, b. portfolio diversification and liquidity;
- disadvantages : a. violation of one-share-one-vote b. reduced take over possibility
- agency conflicts : controlling block holders vs small shareholders
Panel C : Concentrated Ownership and Dispersed Voting Power
- where : any company with voting right restrictions
- advantages : protection of minority rights
- disadvantages : a. violation of one-share-one-vote b. low monitoring incentives, c.
low portfolio diversification possibilities and low liquidity d. higher cost of capital e.
reduced take over possibilities
- agency conflicts :  management vs shareholders
Panel D : Concentrated Ownership and Concentrated Voting Power
- where : Continental Europe, Japan, in any company after take over.
- advantages : high monitoring incentives
- disadvantages : a. low portfolio diversification possibilities and low liquidity b.
reduced take over possibilities
- agency conflicts : controlling block holders vs small shareholders.
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Table 3 b:  Computation of Z Indices - An illustration
Exhibit 1a
String # Possible voting choices Outcome
(A1) (A2) (T)
1 Y Y Y
2 Y N Y
3 N Y N
4 N N N
Results
Number of possible strings
=
4
Number of swings for (A1)
=
2
Number of swings for (A2)
=
0








String # Possible voting choices Outcome
(A1) (A2) (A3) (T)
1 Y Y Y Y
2 Y Y N Y
3 Y N Y Y
4 Y N N N
5 N Y Y Y
6 N Y N N
7 N N Y N
8 N N N N
Results
Number of possible strings
=
8
Number of swings for (A1)
=
2
Number of swings for (A2)
=
2
Number of swings for (A3)
=
2












String # Possible voting choices Outcome
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (T)
1 Y Y Y Y Y
2 Y Y Y N Y
3 Y Y N Y Y
4 Y Y N N Y
5 Y N Y Y Y
6 Y N Y N Y
7 Y N N Y Y
8 Y N N N N
9 N Y Y Y Y
10 N Y Y N N
11 N Y N Y N
12 N Y N N N
13 N N Y Y N
14 N N Y N N
15 N N N Y N
16 N N N N N
Results
Number of possible strings
=
16
Number of swings for (A1)
=
6
Number of swings for (A2),
(A3), (A4) =
2




Z Index (A2), (A3), (A4) = (= 2/12) 0.166
Table 3a : Ownership concentration indices in the insider
and outsider systems
Exhibit 1a                                             Exhibit 1b Exhibit 1c
Exhibit 2
Table 4 : Impact of ownership dynamics on the risk
and financial performance of a stock















































































# of observations 782 782 782 767 767 767
Sample period 1989-1992 1989-1992 1989-1992 1989-1992 1989-1992 1989-1992
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.16 0.16 0.16
- Note 1. Given the presence of missing observations for some years and/or firms in
the sample, the models (fixed effects models with time/year specific dummies, not
reported in this Table) were estimated from an unbalanced panel by feasible GLS
using estimated cross-section residual variances.
- Note 2. Heteroskedasticity robust t-test statistics (in absolute value) are reported in
parentheses. The higher the t-test statistics, the more significant the variable is.
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Table 5 : Control vs ownership for a sample of French companies
Note.  In the graph below, firms are ranked according to the amount of control held by
their largest ultimate shareholder (control is on the vertical axis while firms are
numbered on the horizontal axis.
Shareholder < 50%: control (Z index) 
by ultimate main sharehodler vs 






















1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67
Shareholder > 50%: control (Z index) 
detained by ultimate main shareholder
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1 The following countries adopted the disclosure regulations: Belgium in 1989; Spain in 1989, France
in 1989, Italy in 1974 with adaptation in 1992, Netherlands in 1992, Germany in 1995.
2 For instance, shareholdings exceeding 2% of the equity capital (voting rights) are to be disclosed in
Italy whereas, in most other European countries the notification threshold is at 5%. Furthermore,
disclosure frequency in e.g. Belgium and the UK differs: in the former changes in ownership need to be
reported as soon as the new threshold transgresses any subsequent threshold of 5% (5%, 10%, 15% etc)
of equity whereas in the UK, a change of 1% in a large shareholding (of more than 3%) triggers
disclosure.
3 The European Corporate Governance Network consists of researchers from, among others: Banque
Nationale de Paris, Banca d’Italia, University of Oxford, Princeton University, University of Tilburg,
Free University of Brussels (ECARE), Catholic University of Leuven, University of Vienna,
Autonomous University of Barcelona, University of Groningen, Humboldt University Berlin,
University of Manchester, Stockholm School of Economics, University of Milan.The ECGN is
financed by the European Union and Fondazione E. Mattei (Milan). The Network consists of about 25
researchers at 18 universities and National Banks in 9 European countries.
4 In France, total ownership concentration in CAC40 or DAX30 companies is lower because relatively
high free float is required.
5 This example illustrates the major difference between voting rights and cash flow rights.  Through
control leverage, it is possible to detain control over a large number of entities while only investing
little money (and being entitled to a small portion of the cash flows).
6 Wenger and Kaserer (1997) mention that in a 1992 survey of the 24 largest German companies, banks
controlled over 80 percent of the votes.
7 Usually, the board of directors can only install voting caps after prior consent of the annual general
meeting.  This authority can be delegated for a limited amount of time. In addition, the installation of
voting caps can only happen under specific conditions e.g. when the company is threatened by a hostile
take over. In the only 3 hostile take over attempts since WWII, voting caps were used in each case
(Franks and Mayer, 1998).
8 With prior consent of the shareholders at an annual meeting, the board of directors can issue new
equity, place it with ‘friendly’ shareholders and thus dilute the share stakes of other shareholders.
9 For a theoretical discussion of the free riding problem of dispersed shareholdings.  See for example
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hart (1995b).
10 Low monitoring resulting from voting rights dispersion might be compensated by increased bank
monitoring. In spite of the close connections between banks and industry in Germany, which include
ownership states, positions on the supervisory board and proxy votes, several studies show that German
banks have provided less finance to industry than in UK banks (Edwards and Fisher, 1994 and Edwards
and Ogilvie, 1996). Furthermore, Edwards and Fisher (1998) do not find a positive effect of bank
ownership of equity on the profitability of German firms.
11 The hostile take over market in the US has been considered as a disciplinary device to correct
managerial failure. Empirical research supports this view for the US (Martin and McConnel, 1991).
Several papers on the UK confirm that the targets of hostile take-overs in the 1980s were not poorly
performing, but mostly average or good performers (e.g. Franks and Mayer, 1996).
12 Pioneered by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1983).
13 See for example :  Jensen and Meckling (1976), Milgrom and Roberts (1992).   
14 The theory of implicit contracting is well described in by Grossman and Hart (1982, 1986) Hart and
Holmstrom (1987), Hart and Moore (1988), Hart (1995a).
15 See e.g. Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
16 In countries with the common law system, La Porta et al (1996) build an index which captures
shareholder protection and increases when: shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to
annual meetings; shareholders can mail proxy votes; cumulative voting is allowed; minority protection
legislation is strong; and small shareholders can call extra-ordinary meetings. Regarding creditor
protection, this index increases when the rule of absolute priority is followed in case of financial
distress. However, Franks et al. (1998) conjecture that even within the Anglo-American countries there
are substantial differences in corporate control regulation.  Essentially, this would be because the
relative cost of control is higher in the UK than in the US because of stronger minority protection
legislation than in the US, where the reliance on courts is higher.
17  Because any two shareholders jointly detain a majority of shares.
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18  Because when the main shareholder colludes with any other shareholder, they jointly detain a
majority, whereas all three small shareholders should collude in order to counter A1, a clearly more
difficult task.
19 Although this example may appear overly simplified, we have been able to identify a number of real-
world cases where control over companies behaves as described here.
20  Alternatively, it may happen that a corporate shareholder with more than 50 percent shares in a
subsidiary is himself owned by a dispersed group of shareholders, in which case, it is highly debatable
whether the subsidiary is controlled or not.
21  The authors of this paper are preparing a forthcoming paper discussing the econometrics of the Z
index and some of its game theoretic properties (see Crama et al., 1999).
22 We have avoided the difficult problem of the sense of the causality by only considering lagged
explanatory variables. Indeed, many authors believe that financial performance may have an impact on
the ownership structure, and not just the opposite.  An interesting analysis of this issue can be found in
the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and subsequent work.
23  Leaving aside the issue of the possible existence of a blocking minority.
